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Abstract 
This Article concerns the agency theory before the bankruptcy proceedings with regard to the specifics of the Czech Republic. 
The article tries to find out if there is enough data available to examine how many defaults are launched by bank in the Czech 
Republic. Given that bank lenders have better bargaining power in comparison with other classes of claimants, the view focuses 
on their activity while initiating bankruptcy. We used the data that were collected manually by students of the University of 
Economics in the Research Default project. In summary, companies do not report their performance and therefore we cannot 
assess bank’s activity due to the lack of data. Direct cost in our sample varied from 6% to 153 % of equity value one year before 
bankruptcy and from 1% to 43% of value calculated by simplified market comparison method 3 years before bankruptcy. 
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1. Introduction 
Distressed firms can postpone or even avoid default. Default is a decision that firms or other claimants can take 
earlier or later in distress. Some authors focus on question of what triggers this decision or what is “default 
boundary”, the others focus on who commence it. Moment of initiation is influenced by incentives, motives and 
means of agents who hold claims to the debtor’s assets and can start the proceeding. It is known that private 
borrowers (especially banks) with concentrated and more senior debts have better monitoring position and they have 
better means to start bankruptcy sooner than other creditors. The aim of this article is to find out if it is possible to 
evaluate the activity of banks at the start of bankruptcy in the Czech environment. 
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1.1. Background 
There is a number of research focused on what triggers bankruptcy, what is the bankruptcy boundary (Bulow and 
Shoven, 1978, Davydenko, 2012) as well as agency theory regarding bankruptcy (Haugen and Senbet, 1988; Daigle 
and Maloney, 1994; Povel, 1999; Bris and Welch, 2006; Adler, Capkun, and Weiss, 2013). 
The companies in the Czech environment postpone entry into insolvency (Schönfeld et al. 2013; Škerlíková 
2012) in comparison with other European countries. Postponement negatively affects the recovery rate1 (Smrþka et 
al. 2013). It seems from the other articles (Smrþka, et al. 2013, Rudolfová – Škerlíková, 2014) that firms are highly 
distressed when they commence default at domestic market. Although there are many articles that discuss the 
problem with late initiation of proceedings and suggest possible solutions, they do not identify the exact causes. 
Currently the ex-post efficiency in the domestic market is examined by specialized group concentrated at Faculty of 
Business Administration (meaning researched focused on acts, rules and bankruptcy law in force since 2008). 
Schonfeld et al. (2014) focus primarily on the duration of the proceedings, costs associated with the bankruptcy 
proceedings and low recoveries. Janda and Rakicova (2014) recently prepared a study, which compares legislation 
valid in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia. Ex-post efficiency of prior legislation was examined 
mainly by Knot and Vychodil (2006). They discussed the various bankruptcy legislations across different countries 
and subsequently compared domestic and foreign law. We suppose that the majority of the research on this topic in 
future will focus on behaviour of agents. There are already some papers analysing psychological and behavioural 
data. Houdek and Koblovský (2014) point to a study on various management behaviours and its impact on 
predicting the financial health of the companies they control. A model created by Zhang 2009 assumes that banks 
have special position among the other creditors before the start of insolvency proceedings (hereinafter "IP") and thus 
they are able to initiate bankruptcy proceeding at the exact moment when the value of a company in distress after 
deducting direct costs of bankruptcy equals unpaid loans. Bris and Welch (2006) predict that lower coordination 
costs among multiple lenders improve default recovery. Zhang (2009) argues that the key to understanding the 
financing contracts, credit risk and capital structure consists in understanding decisions on insolvency. 
In the Czech literature the agency theory in bankruptcies is most comprehensively summarized by Richter 
(2008). Smrþka et al. (2013, p. 200-201) described the intentions of individual agents before and after the start of the 
IP especially reorganization in the Czech Republic. In brief they can be summarized as follows: the net effect on the 
recovery after incurring monitoring costs (or cost spent to force to restructure and control) for bank as secured 
creditor ("mostly with good collateral") is minimum ĺ "they have collateral high enough to ensure that they do not 
have to be fundamentally interested in the financial health of individual debtors" 䳑 banks have no intention to 
control or manage their creditors in the reorganization. Above that others (general, unsecured creditors) are aware of 
the fact that the value of the assets of the company after its entry into insolvency is minimal (ie. "The possibility to 
get a value of their claims back is negligible") ĺ their intention to actively participate in the management of 
bankruptcy reorganization are therefore possibly also minimum 䳑 "unsecured creditors have no intention to control 
or manage their creditors in the reorganization." (Smrþka et al., 2013, p. 200-201).  
 
 
1  Recovery rate or recovery is an amount recovered through foreclosure or bankruptcy procedures in event of 
a default, expressed as a percentage of face value of approved debts. The recovery rate measures the extent to which 
the creditor recovers the principal and accrued interest due on a defaulted debt. The recovery rate is recorded as 
cents on the dollar recouped by secured creditors through reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement 
(foreclosure or receivership) proceedings. 
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If there is a way of finding out who started bankruptcy, it would allow us to better estimate when bankruptcy 
starts according to the different capital structure, different seniority and different monitoring possibilities of various 
claimants. This article aims to find out if there are data available to examine the existence of this theory.  
Bank lenders have better monitoring tools and better means to obtain and utilize information against debtors. In 
the empirical part of this paper, we will examine what was the total recovery for the borrower and the size of the 
principal bank loans in the past before bankruptcy (two years or less before the commencement of bankruptcy). 
From these data we will calculate the coefficient, which represents ratio of bank loans to the total recovery of the 
debtor. The data used in this article are collected by "Bankruptcy Research" group at the Faculty of Business at the 
University of Economics in Prague (Mastodon PR, 2015). The actual final sample will be narrowed due to the fact 
that not all companies report their financial statements. In the empirical part of the paper, the ratio between the total 
recovery of debtor and magnitude of bank loans before bankruptcy will be calculated. Calculated direct costs on a 
small sample of recent insolvency procedures are included as well. Added value of this article is the ascertainment 
that from the currently available data we are not able to assess bank activity. 
1.2. Literature review 
Zhang (2009) builds on the work of the other authors (Chava and Roberts, 2008 Nini et al. 2009, Roberts and 
Sufi, 2009) and shows that lenders affect through credit covenant when the company goes into bankruptcy, thus 
affecting both investment and financing of companies. Bulow and Shoven (1978) created two periods model that 
show conflicts of interest between asymmetric claimants that imply there are circumstances under which it is 
optimal for the bank-creditor to force bankruptcy, even if it is associated with the bankruptcy costs. Building on 
work of Black and Cox (1976), Carey and Gordy (2007) derive the optimal value of threshold below which forced 
bankruptcy occurs. They came to the conclusion that banks play a key role in the bankruptcy decision. Furthermore 
they demonstrate that the debtor proposals/insolvency petitions will never be in such an advance so creditors get 
significantly satisfied. Zhang (2009) focused on the bankruptcy threshold as well. This boundary is difficult to 
observe or predict due to the flexible asset value (see Davydenko, 2012). Zhang (2009, p. 20) pointed out that: „The 
key challenge to empirically studying bankruptcy decisions is the lack of a measure of the bankruptcy boundary, 
which is generally unobservable.“ 
2. Description 
How can we determine the identity of the claimant who triggered the insolvency proceedings? Do we have 
enough data to investigate if and when the banks in the Czech Republic start insolvency?  
For firms with a small share of bank debt, bankruptcy is more likely to be triggered by equity holders. In contrast, 
for firms with a large share of bank debt, a bank’s decision to force bankruptcy is more determinative. (Zhang, 2009, 
s. 13) This follows a common assumption in the prior literature that compared with bank lenders, dispersed 
bondholders have poor monitoring ability and high coordination costs. Zhang (2009, s. 7) 
In this article we will rely primarily on the model developed by Zhang (2009). Zhang (2009) focused on the 
conflict of interest between the three groups: owners (equity holders who run the firm), bondholders and banks. 
Loan agreement often contains covenants that allow them to cancel loan contract and thus force bankruptcy. (Zhang, 
2009, p. 7) Before the insolvency proceedings (hereinafter "IP") banks have a special position among the other 
creditors and thus they are able to initiate bankruptcy proceeding the exact moment when the net value of a 
company in distress less direct costs of bankruptcy equals to the unpaid portion of the loan. On the other hand other 
creditors such as bondholders do not have the same position. In addition, banks expect risk from bad loans and 
according to their internal procedures (or other guidance), they treat it in a predetermined manner. For this reason, 
some "start to panic" only in the event when the borrower does not pay interest (not amortizing the loan does not 
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mean the acute risk because the capital is secured).2 
However, the validity of this model in the Czech environment is questionable. In our opinion the applicability 
depends on the relation between levels of loans collateralisation in the USA compared to collateralisation of loans in 
the Czech Republic. 
Hypothesis: Banks are active at the start of bankruptcy in the Czech Republic and they trigger it. 
2.1. Introduction to investigation 
The insolvency law in the Czech Republic classifies creditors into three main classes according to order in which 
they are satisfied. Priority creditors (either a claim against the estate or claims equivalent to the claims against the 
estate) are always satisfied. Secured creditors are satisfied in the second place. Only then the other (non-preferential) 
“general” creditors are satisfied. In addition, there is a group of the claims, which are never satisfied – non-
enforceable claims. 
The decision to liquidate the firm is influenced not only by the degree of control that creditors have over the 
company in bankruptcy (– set it the code, see literature review Škerlíková, 2012), but also on the capital structure. 
The most significant factors are rights, seniority and possibilities to enforce the obligations (length of the 
proceeding, execution efficiency and the threat of bankruptcy – i.e. ex-ante force of bankruptcy legislation).  
Some authors consider the following factors to be the most significant: seniority, competence of the debtor’s 
management and the creditor's responsibility for exercising control over the debtor. (Richter, 2008, p. 116) Seniority 
depends on the type of the "loans" (meaning the terms and conditions). Covenants are connected with the term 
Technical default. Technical default occurs when contractual covenants are violated. A breach of the Covenant is 
legally equivalent to a breach of payment.  
General creditors usually recover only a fraction of the value of the original claim. Absolute priority rule 
diminishes the importance of the disciplining role of debt and transmits it on to senior debt to secured creditors 
(especially secured bank loans) (Richter, 2008, p. 116). In addition to the order (priority, seniority) negotiating and 
monitoring power of individual creditors plays a role in terms of initiating proceedings. They have ability to 
influence the company’s status (for example specific covenant can modify the maturity of loans - see above 
technical default term). 
The cash flow test as defined in insolvency act is defined as following: debtor with financial obligations more 
than 30 days overdue and which debtor is not being able (as opposed to merely not willing) to pay. Act provides a 
number of circumstances in which it shall be presumed that the debtor is not able to pay its obligations. (Faber, 
2012) This fact is amplified by the deeply seated custom to pay debts after maturity day. Smrþka et al. (2013) 
recently quite aptly pointed out that bankruptcy is perceived primarily as an inability of debtor to pay its liabilities. 
On the other hand, the definition as it is stated in the applicable insolvency act is appropriate (liabilities more than 
30 days overdue). Strict compliance with this rule would end the majority of Czech companies. The ability not to 
pay one’s obligations in terms of maturity often reflects the bargaining power of large companies in the Czech 
Republic. Moreover domestic small companies pay late or do not pay their debts at all as “a part of survival policy”. 
The problem is that, debtor who is not willing to pay its debts could not default because he is not insolvent 
according to the definition in the act. Everybody assume that debts will not be paid immediately because it is usual 
practice. Due to this (time) distortion occurs. When creditors finally realize that debtor is actually not able to pay its 
debts it is already too late. Debtor is highly over-indebted and general creditors have only little hope to be satisfied. 
 
 
2 In this article we will not focus on the risk arising from a possible decline in the value of collateral due to the sale 
of assets under "time-pressure" in the liquidation proceedings. In addition, the value of collateral is subject to 
specific evaluation procedure for the pledge (estimated price of a collateral is usually lower than the market price).
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2.2. Investigation 
We undertook a deeper analysis of the sample obtained by Schönfeld et al. (2013). Therefore the sampling 
method remains the same. We considered only procedures that led to the liquidation of firms. We excluded sole 
proprietors from initial sample because they are not obliged to prepare financial statements. Furthermore some 
defaulted firms do not submit their financial statements regularly in some years prior to bankruptcy (see Bokšová – 
Randáková, 2013 or Rudolfová - Škerlíková 2014). 
2.3. The Environment 
Due to the differences in the economic environment in the US and in Europe Zhang’s model may be not 
applicable. In addition, a Czech market is a small market with a high occurrence of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Ministry  
of Industry and Trade in the Czech Republic define small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as they are 
stated in the Recommendation 2003/361/ EU from EU Commission. According to their assumption SMEs formed 
54% of added value and provide nearly 69% of jobs. (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SBA Fact Sheet – The Czech 
Republic, 2014). Moreover only small fraction of domestic companies issues bonds. Therefore in the Czech 
Republic there are two significant classes of claimants (banks and general creditors) except owners themselves. 
Type of collateral can have a strong impact on recovery rate as well. Some bank loans can be secured by real estate, 
others by current assets such as receivables or work in progress. On the other hand the other factors are still valid in 
the Czech environment, especially motivation and intentions of agents. 
2.4. Direct costs 
The model assumes that banks are able to predict magnitude of direct costs, which directly impact recovery rate. 
Due to this it would be beneficial to map magnitude of direct costs under current domestic legislation. Insolvency 
register contains this information.  
Direct costs concern all the expenses paid for lawyers, accountants, financial advisors and other professionals; 
they are carried out as a direct result of entering the formal bankruptcy process, so they are relatively easy to 
calculate. These costs has been investigated often on samples of US firms (see Tashjian, Lease and McConnell, 
1996; Lawless and Ferris, 1997; Betker, 1997; Warner, 1977; Altman, 1984; Lubben, 2000; Weiss, 1990; LoPucky 
and Doherty, 2004; Bris, Welch and Zhu, 2006; Hotchkiss, Kose, Mooradian and Thorburn, 2008). To our 
knowledge there are not recently published articles mapping these costs. Therefore we tried to measure them on a 
small sample. 
We identified direct costs as they have been authorized by the court (some of them were not paid from the estate 
due to insufficient debtor wealth). We choose all insolvency proceedings with available resolution to approve 
insolvency motion (in Czech Usnesení o schválení koneþné zprávy) from 3. October 2014 till 22. February 2015 
with publicly available financial statements at least for 5 accounting periods. We are aware that we omitted cost 
incurred and paid as a regular wage to debtors’ employees. Total direct cost can be slightly higher (some direct cost 
can be pain in normal wages and salaries to debtor’s employees). We have calculated value of the company before 
the bankruptcy by using multiples for Europe. Value of net assets is shown as well. The findings are presented in the 
table.
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Table 1. Direct cost of bankruptcy 
Name Trustee renumeration 
Administration 
Costs 
Other 
costs, 
services 
Wages, 
Severence 
& Cred. 
Com. 
Default 
- Date 
Total 
Direct 
Cost 
Equity 
value 5 y 
before 
default 
Equity 
value 1 y 
before 
defualt 
Direct 
cost % of 
comp. 
value 
AD Truck, s.r.o. 54 13 76 32 07-I-10 175 n/a -1 985 n/a 
Agro ModĜice, a.s. 1 354 643 1 629 715 29-VII-11 4 340 n/a 11 513 0,1707 
AGT International CZ, s.r.o. 68 25 11 625 13-V-11 729 n/a -1 375 n/a 
AMR Amaranth, a.s. 54 7 233 1 995 15-IV-13 2 289 5 519 n/a 0,1274 
Asbk - 2000, s.r.o. 45 4 0 0 13-V-14 49 -10 712 -11 034 n/a 
Danco Plus, a.s. 102 1 0 261 06-VI-14 364 1 194 -4 731 n/a 
Fulvia steel, s.r.o. 54 0 11 0 27-II-14 66 -392 -1 997 n/a 
Fwds FVE Bohemia, a.s. 54 27 0 0 21-VII-10 82 n/a -7 463 0,0066 
gp production, a.s. v likvidaci 132 8 0 0 15-IV-13 140 2 461 2 423 0,4251 
Helpteam, a.s. 711 28 611 4 128 07-XII-11 5 478 n/a 24 499 n/a 
Impollex, a.s. 115 61 320 16 13-XII-12 512 2 433 1 703 n/a 
Jakobe, a.s. 541 50 535 4 200 09-V-13 5 325 8 419 3 478 -0,0530 
Madree promotion, s.r.o. 54 10 0 77 29-V-13 142 205 340 n/a 
MAN Shop, s.r.o. 54 2 0 0 05-VI-14 57 200 200 n/a 
MedvČd, s.r.o. 76 5 0 56 27-I-14 136 -998 -3 175 n/a 
Reality Milenium, s.r.o. 141 250 59 0 21-VI-11 450 n/a 1 356 n/a 
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Sandragon, s.r.o. 54 4 1 0 13-IX-13 59 -627 -2 421 n/a 
Sepes Promotion, s.r.o. 54 4 0 0 04-II-14 59 -8 397 -9 689 n/a 
Spoleþnost B + B, s.r.o. 54 1 9 0 23-X-13 65 231 -102 n/a 
TOP Sign, s.r.o. 420 63 962 261 15-IV-09 1 707 n/a 8 369 n/a 
Unikumm, s.r.o. 54 9 0 0 24-IX-13 63 -1 381 -1 682 n/a 
Source: (MS ýR, 2014; Mastodont PR, 2015; Damodaran, 2015 and authorial computation)
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2.5. The model assumptions 
The insolvency starts when the court approves the debtor’s or creditor’s insolvency petition. Based on the 
literature and further analysis of the behavior of agents, Zhang (2009) compiled a model, which shows that a bank 
start a insolvency procedure exactly at the moment when the total expected recovery is just sufficient to cover the 
bank debt. He considers only two kinds of bankruptcies; voluntary - triggered by the equity holders and forced - by 
the bank’s decision to accelerate/exercise its loan. Voluntary bankruptcy is based on economic situation and 
disadvantageous running of the firm. Debtor can be forced by a bank to file a petition. In consistency with our 
previous studies we noticed that petitions submitted directly by banks are exceptional. This does not contradict the 
above-mentioned information. 
Zhang (2009, s. 19) proxies for the bankruptcy boundary by a normalized realization of the bankruptcy boundary 
(hereinafter “NRBB“) as the ratio of the total recovery of a defaulted firm to its total bank-debt principal amount. He 
expects that the NRBB for a bank-triggered bankruptcy would be 1, and that the value deviates from 1 if the 
bankruptcy is triggered by equity holders. He tested this hypothesis with a regression analysis. 
We will consider an item B.lV Bank loans and overdrafts according to format of the Czech financial statements 
to represent loan principal. 
The value of NRBB should be 1 for bank-triggered bankruptcies and should deviate from 1 for voluntary 
bankruptcy filings. The more the value will differ from one the more likely this is a voluntary bankruptcy and vice 
versa. 
 
 
LP
TRNRBB  , (1) 
 
where 
 
NRBB
  
a normalized realization of the bankruptcy boundary, 
 TR the firm-wide recovery, 
 LP the total bank-debt principal. 
 
The higher quantity of the ratios oscillating around one, the higher bank activity and bank monitoring is in the 
Czech Republic. It is interesting that some companies with significant loans have very low recovery. This can be 
caused by collateral which is can not be sell easily or high selling cost; such as not finished construction, work in 
progress or bad receivables. On the other hand, from whole sample, which included 3222 defaulted companies (both 
legal and personal bankruptcies), there are only 52 companies with reasonable data available as well as loans with 
balance higher than zero. Results are shown in the second table. 
Table 2.  The ratio of bank loans to total return 
Organization 
ID number Name 
Date of 
commencement 
Balance 
sheet 
date 
Liabilities Loans Interest NRBB total recovery 
112518 
ZemČdČlské 
Obchodní Družstvo 
Mirotice 
39653 39813 37969 -1746 137 -8,710290951 15208,168 
28198565 Sartoria, s.r.o. 40627 40178 8474 1 0 0 
27861872 Star Capital Prague, s.r.o. 40897 40543 3716 2 2138 0 0 
25516922 Komawel, s.r.o. 40675 40543 20974 4 1 52,00665 208,0266 
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26374935 Koltex k+k, s.r.o. 40219 40178 3814 8 9 8,875 71 
27074072 MN Design, a.s. 41390 41274 45761 72 0 0 
27215601 ReD okna, s.r.o. 40301 40178 5047 88 0 0 
49194003 Papy, s.r.o. 39911 39813 396 111 3 0 0 
27120554 Relax nábytek, s.r.o. 40123 39813 555 117 8 0 0 
25896466 AMB Trade, s.r.o. v likvidaci 39983 39813 2845 150  4,370070733 655,51061 
27283020 ADZ UNI, s.r.o. 40221 40178 11344 197 24 0 0 
63075351 Elgas Zlín, s.r.o. 39835 39813 847 224 0 0 
25411926 Kovo - Neki, s.r.o. v likvidaci 40292 40178 3170 270 10 0,229055556 61,845 
60914807 Onyx, s.r.o. 40617 40178 1784 293 38 0 0 
63484307 Prokovo, s.r.o. 39632 39631 8432 300 1,332773333 399,832 
26920611 Sttf, s.r.o. 40234 40178 8203 329 3 0 0 
60718421 Forset, s.r.o. 40032 39813 1545 358 22 0,182664804 65,394 
27783456 Hoffmann CZ & EU, s.r.o. 40241 40178 3525 362 37 0 0 
46506756 Trans - Cleaner, s. r. o. 40725 40543 3320 430  0 0 
27389154 Prague Transfer, s.r.o. 40245 39813 820 460 38 0 0 
25600206 Del Ponte,Sandler & Partners, s.r.o. 39667 39813 9651 539  0,072035696 38,82724 
48400653 UNIST, s.r.o. 40392 40178 615 73 0 0 
60794143 IPD Group, s.r.o. 39710 39709 6948 690 31 0,899182609 620,436 
25934465 Transport 101 Logistic, s.r.o. 40239 40178 4822 742 114 0,137560647 102,07 
26911434 Cyber Stream Technology, s.r.o. 40221 40178 7632 809 8 0,326328801 264 
25434128 ACE EX, s.r.o. 40500 39813 5381 841 33 0 0 
25649426 Matylda, s.r.o. 40039 39813 1189 884 73 0 0 
26365359 Lékárna Nemocnice Sokolov, s.r.o. 40224 39813 9999 937 98 0,462560299 433,419 
44265280 Morafis,spol.s r.o. 39870 39813 15571 1025 6,190934634 6345,708 
61776751 Spojplus, s.r.o. 39786 39785 7592 1102 0,542657768 598,00886 
27086887 Cosmet - pro plus Praha, s.r.o. 40112 39813 6727 1144 8 0 0 
26384604 
Soukromá stĜední 
umČleckoprĤmyslová 
škola PlzeĖ - 
Husova, s.r.o. 
40738 40543 3393 1149  0 0 
27694089 Valašská divize, s.r.o. 40352 40178 47081 1168 151 2,348135274 2742,622 
27862755 Veronský dĤm, s.r.o. 39983 39813 3922 1227 56 0,176353708 216,386 
27313425 Movintra, s.r.o. 40326 39813 7447 1805 0,382766205 690,893 
26730391 Dion Stavby, s.r.o. 40450 40178 7894 1884 35 0 0 
26512025 Hajmi, s.r.o. v 39602 39601 5100 2048 19 0,012204102 24,994 
417 Tatiana Škerlíková and Lucie Rudolfová /  Procedia Economics and Finance  25 ( 2015 )  408 – 419 
 
likvidaci 
27776379 Hermex, s.r.o. 40654 40543 5555 2209 184 0,036288818 80,162 
63481111 Galleria Garden, s.r.o. 40316 39813 6953 2701 123 0,849390596 2294,204 
49283847 Agroplastik, s.r.o. 40807 40178 16030 2746 234 1,222263146 3356,3346 
27109763 Artexa Praha , s.r.o. 39842 39813 38080 3070 361 0 0 
27109763 Artexa Praha , s.r.o. 39842 39813 38080 3070 361 0 0 
28345339 ICE Harmony, s.r.o. 40850 40178 7047 3078 0 0 
48952435 TOS - MET, s.r.o. 40015 39813 161304 3961 2382 0 0 
27625401 Matymont, s.r.o. 40382 39813 33791 4001 189 0 0 
26315084 Stavebniny Global, s.r.o. 40387 40543 17710 5101  0,004472848 22,816 
25818937 Rubus Invest, a.s. 40032 39813 38384 5757 309 0 0 
25084801 MKK, s.r.o. 39864 40543 24169 5914 0,057570849 340,474 
47670703 Flipol, s.r.o. 40457 40178 23752 6000 393 0,093874088 563,24453 
25291076 Sport pro Každého, s.r.o. 40218 39813 42360 6222 360 0,014900423 92,71043 
25459201 Moravia Foundry, a.s. 39587 39489 148338 33874 119 0,04193647 1420,556 
49357611 I.Q.A., a.s. 40224 40178 158607 105616 6183 0,011278821 1191,224 
Source: (MS ýR, 2014, Mastodont PR, 2014, and authorial computation) 
It is obvious that it is not possible to assess banks activity from the data accessible. In future the research focused 
on overdue receivables could give us better understanding of the Czech insolvencies and low recovery rates. 
3. Conclusion 
It is known that the postponement of the inception of default (bankruptcy) negatively affects the recovery rate. 
Banks can monitor debtors more effectively and possess better means to initiate default. This gives them a specific 
position among the other classes of claimants. On the basis of already conducted research abroad, we assumed that 
bank lenders can initiate proceedings in a better timeframe than other creditors i.e. trigger bankruptcy when the 
value of the debtor's business after deducting direct costs of bankruptcy is just sufficient to repay the principal of the 
loan provided by the bank lender. 
Assuming that the bank is aware of the moment when the borrower is in financial distress and it considers high 
return of principal as a more important than interest payments it can be expect that ratio of recovery to loan principal 
oscillates around the one for bankruptcies induced by banks. The aim of this article was to determine if there is 
enough data to determine in what ranges fluctuate the ratios calculated as bank debt to total recovery after deducting 
direct costs. We have found out that even significant bank loans are not recovered. This can be caused by “bad 
collateral” or no collateral or debtor who did not reported financial results correctly. As a sample we used data 
collected in other research and match them with financial statements reported in the business register. At first we 
map direct cost of recent defaults. It seems it is easy to predict value of direct cost according to the procedure and 
company size. However due to late commencement of procedure 6 from 14 companies with data available in our 
sample had negative equity value even five years before default. Due to this the bigger sample has to be obtained to 
investigate average direct cost in the Czech Republic. At second we calculate a ratio by dividing firm‘s wide 
recovery by the total principal of bank debt. We evaluated how many of calculated ratios were close to number one. 
However, it is impossible to evaluate bank activity because there is not enough data (financial statements of 
defaulted companies publicly) available. In future it would be more promising to conduct study about relation 
between overdue receivables and low recovery rates in the Czech Republic. 
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